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REVIEW ESSAY
Keepers of the Flame:
Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts (Fifth Edition)
and the Prosser Legacy
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS. By W. Page Keeton
(General Editor), Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G.
Owen (5th ed.). St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1984. Stu-
dent Edition: pp. xxiii, 1286, $25.95. Lawyer's Edition: pp. xxiii,
1456, $44.95.
Reviewed by Craig Joyce*
"Prosser on Torts!
It has a completed sound, a belonging sound, a natural sound,
a sound to be remembered for years to come."'
O 1986 by Craig Joyce and Vanderbilt Law Review.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A., 1970,
Dartmouth College; M.A. (Jurisprudence), 1972, Oxford University; J.D., 1975, Stanford
Law School. For assistance in the preparation of this Review, the author thanks Alvin L.
Harris of the Vanderbilt Law School Class of 1985, as well as Gregory R. Samuel '85, An-
nette v. Tucker '86, and Timothy K. Garrett '86.
1. Wade, William L. Prosser: Some Impressions and Recollections, 60 CA iF. L. REv.
1255, 1255 (1972) (in memoriam). (John W. Wade is dean emeritus and distinguished pro-
fessor emeritus at Vanderbilt Law School.)
More recently, the Washington Post has described Prosser as "a scholar and author who
was to torts what Dr. Spock is to child care." Reid, The Liability Crisis: Litigation Loosens
the Stiff Upper Lip, The Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 2, A7, col. 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rarely in the history of American legal education has one au-
thor's name been so clearly identified with his subject as the name
of William L. Prosser is with the law of torts. Even today, fourteen
years after his death in 1972, "Prosser on Torts" remains in the
minds of students, teachers, the bench, and the bar alike a single
thought, its parts indistinguishable one from the other. Indeed, the
passage of time has done nothing to diminish the influence of the
man on the subject. His articles remain landmarks in the develop-
ment both of the literature of torts and of the law itself.2 The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, begun by Prosser in 1963 and re-
cently completed under the reportership of John W. Wade of
Vanderbilt, increases in authority with every passing year.3 Pros-
ser's casebook on torts, now in the third printing of its seventh
edition, remains the most widely adopted text in a highly competi-
tive market.4 All in all, no small accomplishment for a notorious
practical joker who, until nearly his fiftieth birthday, had spent his
entire legal career as a student, teacher, and practitioner in the
provinces of Minnesota, far from the established capitals of
scholarship. 5
There is more, however, to the Prosser legacy. In many re-
spects, and certainly in the minds of the generations of lawyers
who have studied from and employed it to their profit and amuse-
2. See, e.g., Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 874 (1939); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953); Prosser, The Bor-
derland of Tort and Contract, in W. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics IN THE LAW OF TORTS (The
Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, Fourth Series, University of Michigan) (1954); Prosser, Injuri-
ous Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1959); Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Vol. 1 at III, vol. 2 at III (1965).
4. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 3d
printing 1982).
5. Prosser was born on March 15, 1898 in New Albany, Indiana. He received a B.A.
from Harvard in 1918, served in the Marines during World War I, and attained an LL.B.
from the University of Minnesota in 1928. Following admission to the Minnesota bar, he
joined the Minneapolis firm of Dorsey, Colman, Barker, Scott & Barber in 1928. He was
appointed to the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School in 1930, where he re-
mained until reentering practice with his old law firm in 1943. G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA. AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 156 (1980). Prosser joined the Harvard Law School
faculty in 1947, but left in the following year for the University of California at Berkeley
(Boalt Hall). Eldredge, William Lloyd Prosser, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1972). He
served as dean there until 1961 and remained a member of the faculty until 1963. In the
latter year, he moved across the Bay to Hastings College of the Law, where he remained
until his death in 1972.
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ment, the jewel in the crown remains Prosser's Handbook of the
Law of Torts.6 The fourth and last edition of the Handbook to be
edited by Prosser himself appeared in 1971. Much has occurred in
the law of torts since then, including the explosion of products lia-
bility litigation in the 1970s. As the need for a thorough updating
and revision of the Handbook became increasingly obvious, West
Publishing Company faced the choice of discontinuing the work or
transferring responsibility for it to an author capable of carrying
on in the Prosser tradition, if indeed such a scholar could be
found. West eventually settled upon an ingenious solution. It en-
trusted the task to a team of revisers, selected and supervised by
W. Page Keeton of Texas as General Editor.7 The result is Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, Fifth Edition, published in 1984.
The legal profession has expected much of the Fifth Edition,
and rightly so. As custodians of Prosser's learning, insights, and
style, how well have the revisers fared? Also, to what extent have
they added constructively to the edifice erected in the first four
editions of the Handbook? The answers to these questions require
a survey both of Prosser's legacy and of the accomplishments of his
successors.
II. THE FIRST EDITION
The beginnings of the Handbook in 1941 were humble, or so
its author would have had his readers believe. Prosser began the
6. There were four editions of PROSSER ON TORTS, dated 1941, 1955, 1964, and 1972,
prior to the 1984 edition entitled PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (Fifth Edi-
tion). All editions have appeared in West Publishing Company's Hornbook Series. For the
benefit of the curious, West has provided the following capsule history of the "hornbook":
It was used throughout Europe and America between the late 1400s and the mid-
dle 1700s.
Shaped like an old-fashioned butter paddle, the first hornbooks were made of
wood. The paper lesson the child was to learn was fastened to the wooden paddle and
covered with a piece of horn. The transparent strip of horn was made by soaking a
cow's horn in hot water and peeling it away at the thickness of a piece of celluloid. The
horn was necessary to protect the lesson from the damp and perhaps grubby hands of
the child. Hornbooks commonly contained the alphabet, the vowels, and the Lord's
Prayer.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS ii (W.P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D.
Owen 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROsSER AND KEETON]. Hence, as West explains,
the hornbook was originally a "first book for children." Id. (quoting Dr. Johnson). Interest-
ingly, this description appears facing the title page of the Lawyer's Edition of the new Pros-
ser and Keeton hornbook, but not in the Student Edition.
7. The other revisers of the Fifth Edition were Dan B. Dobbs of the University of
Arizona, Robert E. Keeton of Harvard Law School, and David G. Owen of the University of
South Carolina.
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preface to the First Edition by recalling ironically the example of
Joel Bishop, who upon proposing to write a text on torts in 1853
had been advised by prospective publishers that no market existed
for such a work and that, "if the book were written by the most
eminent and prominent author that ever lived, not a dozen copies
a year could be sold."' Obviously, as Prosser pointed out, the out-
pouring of cases and periodical commentaries on torts since
Bishop's day made the availability of a work on the subject greatly
more desirable a century later. Prosser's stated goals were modest.
He had attempted, he wrote in the preface, "to keep the text...
relatively simple throughout" (for the benefit of students), but to
make the footnote material "much more extensive than is usual in
a [work] of this size" (as an aid to practitioners).9 Overall, he had
tried to select decisions and secondary discussions "particularly
significant in light of the problems of the present day." 10 Although
he left the thought unexpressed, no doubt Prosser anticipated
stronger sales than those projected for Bishop.
He need not have worried. Among students and practitioners,
the Handbook won an immediate and enthusiastic following. In ad-
dition, it quickly achieved widespread acceptance among Prosser's
academic peers. Of the sixteen reviews that appeared immediately
following its publication, not one was critical." A young Page Kee-
ton observed: "In this book Professor Prosser has given the subject
of torts the most thorough and thoughtful treatment that it has
yet received.' 1 2 Indeed, Prosser himself supplied the work's most
searching, if hardly damaging, criticism in his whimsical report on
the proceedings at a mythical symposium of the National Union of
8. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS vii (Ist ed. 1941). In publishing the
first edition of his hornbook, Prosser joined an illustrious company: other entries in the
Hornbook Series, according to an advertisement immediately preceding the preface, in-
cluded ATKINSON ON WILLS, BOGERT ON TRUSTS, DOBIE ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCE-
DURE, GOODRICH ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, MILLER ON CRIMINAL LAW,
POWELL ON AGENCY, STEVENS ON CORPORATIONS, VANCE ON INSURANCE, and VOLD ON SALES.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at vii.
10. Id.
11. See Campbell, Book Review, 26 MINN. L. REV. 137 (1941); Edgar, Book Review, 16
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 166 (1941); Eldredge, Book Review, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1942); Feezer,
Book Review, 36 ILL. L. REV. 594 (1942); Gifford, Book Review, 27 IOWA L. REV. 172 (1941);
Gregory, Book Review, 9 U. CHL L. REV. 196 (1941); Harper, Book Review, 55 HARv. L. REV.
312 (1941); Keeton, Book Review, 20 TEx. L. REV. 255 (1941); Lockhart, Book Review, 30
CALIF. L. REV. 120 (1941); MacIntyre, Book Review, 4 ALBERTA L.Q. 160 (1941); Richards,
Book Review, 7 Mo. L. REV. 198 (1942); Sealy, Book Review, 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 249
(1942); Traylor, Book Review, 30 Ky. L.J. 336 (1942); Vold, Book Review, 11 FORDHAM L.
REV. 239 (1942); Wilson, Book Review, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 159 (1941).
12. Keeton, supra note 11, at 255.
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Torts Scholars, popularly known as "N.U.T.S."' Is As one eminent
intellectual historian has noted aptly: "When an author is his se-
verest public critic, success or anonymity is assured, and Prosser
was not destined to be anonymous." '
Clearly, many factors contributed to this warm reception. One
was the Handbook's style. Whereas the works of leading torts
scholars who preceded Prosser, most notably the redoubtable
Francis Bohlen, had suffered from "cumbersome, weighty prose" of
minimal aesthetic appeal, "Prosser's picturesqueness saturated
every level of his writing on Torts."'" A contemporary found Pros-
ser's expression "bright," "spritely," and "fun to read."'" Another
remarked of the First Edition that "there are frequent sentences
which not only drive home a point to, but also produce a smile for
the reader. Some may deprecate this but a little sparkle and levity
can be a good thing in a law book as well as elsewhere.' 17 Prosser's
ability to bring his material to life, therefore, significantly
strengthened the appeal of the work.
Even more important to the success of the Handbook was the
author's characteristic methodology in analyzing the raw data of
his subject matter. In surveying the law of torts as it had devel-
oped to 1941, Prosser saw spread before him a picture of vast and
surfeiting disarray. To this untidy scene, he brought order. Prosser
viewed the seemingly scattershot cases on the various issues of tort
law as capable of reconciliation and harmonization, if only the in-
dividual parts of those decisions were disassembled, inventoried,
and recombined to illustrate the common values that, taken as a
whole, they sought to vindicate (or, in Prosser's view, ought to vin-
dicate).' 8 In effect, he treated the "doctrines" of tort law as amal-
gams of principles and processes, each of which could be reduced
to a relatively simple formula. Each formula distilled the aggregate
13. See Prosser, Book Review, 4 LA. L. REv. 156, 156 (1941). Prosser's "critics" at the
symposium included Warren A. Seavey of Harvard, Fleming James, Jr. and Harry Shulman
of Yale, Laurence H. Eldredge of Pennsylvania, Charles 0. Gregory of Chicago, Fowler V.
Harper of Indiana, Leon Green of Northwestern, and Clarence Morris and W. Page Keeton
of Texas. Prosser's response to them all: "that he was very sorry, that he greatly regretted
the whole matter, and that he would never do it again." Id. at 164.
14. G.E. WHIm, supra note 5, at 162 (1980).
15. Id. at 156.
16. Wade, supra note 1, at 1255.
17. Eldredge, supra note 11, at 505.
18. As Prosser admitted elsewhere in his writings, the process of administering justice
entailed weighing the interests of the plaintiff against the interests of the defendant, "to-
gether with the importance of those [interests] themselves." Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REv. 1, 17 (1953).
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wisdom of countless cases, "no one of which precisely embodied all
the elements of the formula" in quite the form propounded by
Prosser."9 By deriving these "general rules" of tort law, he hoped
to provide encapsulations "sufficiently flexible to allow for the par-
ticular circumstances, and yet so rigid that lawyers may predict
what the decision may be, and men may guide their conduct by
that prediction.''12
To accomplish his goal, Prosser collected a vast number of
cases (more than 15,000 in the footnotes of the First Edition)21 to
dramatize the diversity of the reported decisions and presumably
also to emphasize the need for general rules. He frequently used
examples and hypotheticals to show graphically the operation of
the rules upon various fact patterns rather than simply stating the
doctrine at issue abstractly. The clarity of understanding that
these techniques produced undoubtedly helped to make the Hand-
book more popular and widely read.2
Style and methodology, however, are not everything in aca-
demic law. Ultimately, the success of Prosser's Handbook turned
on a third factor largely external to its author's undoubted talents.
That factor was timing. In the decades immediately preceding the
appearance of the Handbook, an exuberant Realism had domi-
nated the intellectual climate of American law.2 3 In its extreme
form, Realism maintained that "the participants in a case, the at-
mosphere it created, and the interests at stake were what deter-
mined [the case's] outcome, quite independent of rules or princi-
ples. ' 24 Indeed, militant Realists had scorned certainty and
predictability as legitimate ends of the legal system, arguing that
maturity and wisdom came with the recognition that legal issues
were endlessly diverse, complex, and fluid.25 By 1940, Realism had
become the subject of a pronounced critical reaction. American le-
gal thought seemed to be "in quest of itself,"26 as scholars both in
19. G.E. WrTE, supra note 5, at 157.
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 17-18.
21. Id. at vii.
22. These techniques also helped to make it more widely cited. For commentary on
the Fifth Edition's appendix, collecting instances of "Prosser in the Courts," see infra notes
68-69 and accompanying text.
23. See generally G.E. WHrE, supra note 5, at 63-113.
24. Id. at 85 (citing reviews of L. GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES
(1931)). Green argued that "the science of law" was in reality "the science of the adminis-
tration of law." Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L. REv.
1014, 1016 (1929) (emphasis added).
25. G.E. WHITE, supra note 5, at 139.
26. See generally L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
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torts and in other areas of the law began to confront and reject
Realism's inability to formulate any comprehensive analytical
framework on which trained professionals could agree."
Prosser had the good fortune to be the right person in the
right place at the right time. Clearly, any satisfactory response to
Realism had to encompass more than a mere return to the barren
Scientism to which Realism had been a reaction. By the 1940s Le-
gal Science in its pure form was a dead letter.2" To be sure, schol-
ars had begun to show a renewed interest in doctrinal perspectives
on torts, as a means of restoring unity and certainty to the law.29
But the Realists' emphasis on process, which the essential accuracy
of their observations fortified, was by then beyond total uprooting
from the scholarly consciousness.30 Instead, the quest for a new,
reunifying vision of tort law evolved into a search not for the false
certainty of hard-and-fast rules, but for a justifiable faith that
American common law was fundamentally moral, rational, and, if
subjected to diligent analysis, capable of producing predictable re-
sults on which competent scholars could agree. Thus, tort law
might be viewed as a proper subject of what Professor G. Edward
White of Virginia calls "Consensus Thought. 1 1
The methodology of Prosser's Handbook, aided and abetted
by his appealing style, ideally suited the needs of Consensus
Thought, which it also helped to define. In effect, Prosser fused the
insights of the Realists, who emphasized the possibilities of social
27. See G.E. WHirrE, supra note 5, at 139-40.
28. The school of thought known as Legal Science had flourished during the late nine-
teenth century, the heyday of the scientific method. Proponents of this approach rejected
what they regarded as "dogmatic propositions" handed down, as if from on high, by prior
generations of legal scholars. Nonetheless, the Scientists believed in the power of inductive
logic to extract from the decided cases a series of general principles that then could be
shaped into a comprehensive doctrinal system. Realists, in contrast, were skeptical of all
doctrine, no matter how derived. They sought not an organizing theoretical framework for
the law, but rather a methodology capable of explicating the decisional process in particular
cases, with all the potential for purposeful engineering of social policy that such an ap-
proach seemed to promise. See generally id. at 20-113.
29. As exponents of this view, White cites Warren Seavey, Roscoe Pound, Clarence
Morris, and Page and Robert Keeton, all of whom either taught or had studied law at
Harvard. Id. at 153.
30. See id. at 110-13.
31. Consensus Thought sought to restablish a theoretical predictability in the law by
drawing usable generalizations from the study of large numbers of cases with similar or
overlapping fact patterns. Although exemplars of this school never reasserted the Scientists'
claim that the principles so discovered should be accorded the status of eternal verities,
neither did they accept the apparent view of many Realists that predictability was a goal
not only beyond attainment, but also vaguely illegitimate. See generally id. at 139-46.
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engineering, with the countervailing demands of the doctrinally-
oriented Scientists and their latter-day descendants for renewed
predictability in the law.32 Prosser's genius was to acknowledge
and identify the various interests to be balanced, while relentlessly
asserting (and, by copious citations and deceptively simple illustra-
tions, seeming to prove) that the results of the cases, on proper
analysis, were but multiple, somewhat varied yet ultimately consis-
tent examples of Prosser's own general rules.
Whatever the relative importance of the Handbook's style,
methodology, and timing, the magic of the First Edition was unde-
niable. The miracle is that Prosser managed not only to maintain
but even to improve upon that achievement in the next thirty
years.
III. PROSSER'S SUBSEQUENT EDITIONS
Following the Handbook's initial triumph in 1941, it went
through three further editions under Prosser's authorship. Each
appeared more quickly than its predecessor. Prosser waited four-
teen years before publishing the Second Edition in 1955. Nine
years later came the Third Edition in 1964 and, eight years after
that, the Fourth Edition in 1971.33 Prosser continually reworked
his treatment of the fundamental principles of tort law, clarifying
his presentation through adjustments in organization, keeping the
work fresh by the addition of new illustrations, and updating his
citations to recent cases and articles. He also carried out major re-
visions of the Handbook in rapidly developing areas of law, such as
products liability, defamation, privacy, and immunities. Together,
these efforts dramatically enhanced the work's value to the
profession.
Just as he had done in introducing the First Edition, 4 Prosser
affected considerable modesty in describing the aims of succeeding
volumes of the Handbook. In his preface to the Fourth Edition, he
wrote:
As before, [the writer] must express his gratitude, together with his apologies,
to the dozens of other able and distinguished writers whose ideas he has un-
32. Id. at 157.
33. During the same period of 1941 to 1971, Prosser remained prolifically active on
other scholarly projects. See supra notes 2 (articles), 3 (Second Restatement), and 4
(casebook). The secret of this phenomenal output, one of Prosser's collaborators has said,
was a "pent-up energy" that allowed him to complete writings of epic proportions in "much
less than minimum time." Wade, supra note 1, at 1256.
34. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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blushingly appropriated. A packrat is at best a collector, and no heroic figure;
and the most that can be said for him is that he sometimes chooses well.35
Surely, as a critical self-assessment, this is one of the great under-
statements in all legal writing. It may be praise too strong to label
Prosser, or indeed any figure who inhabits primarily the groves of
academe, "heroic." But much more can be said to commend the
first four editions of the Handbook than that its author "some-
times ch[ose] well." In terms of both presentation and substance,
Prosser proved himself to be what today might be called a Great
Communicator.
Only a hopeless illiterate could dispute that Prosser presented
his materials with uncommon felicity and tidiness. Edition after
edition, the Handbook remained eminently readable-even a
joy-because of the unique Prosser style. 6 But clarity of presenta-
tion also played a major part in enhancing the work's popularity.
Each chapter contained many clearly labeled sections, which in
turn divided neatly into a handful of clearly labeled segments of
readily digestible length. From one edition to another, the organi-
zation of the chapters remained basically the same (apart from an
occasional new or reorganized chapter reflecting increased empha-
sis on a particular area of the law by the courts and society). 7
35. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS xi (4th ed. 1971).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. For example, Prosser's description of
the reasonable person's responsibility for anticipating the conduct of others shows his
unique style:
Under all ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any reason to expect
the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will
obey the criminal law. Under such ordinary circumstances, it is not reasonably to be
expected that anyone will intentionally tamper with a railway track, blow up a powder
magazine, forge a check, push another man into an excavation, assault a railway pas-
senger, or hold up a bowling alley and shoot a patron. Although such things do occur,
as must be known to anyone who reads the daily papers, they are still so unlikely in
any particular instance that the burden of taking continual precautions against them
exceeds the apparent risk.
W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 173-74 (citations omitted). As White points out, Prosser's
citations, indicating that each of these supposedly unanticipatable events was the subject of
an actual lawsuit, "only heightened his effect." G.E. WHITE, supra note 5, at 156-57.
37. Not every change in the organization of the Handbook should be ascribed to
changes in the state of the law. For example, the First Edition contained a single chapter,
entitled "Proximate Cause," in which Prosser discussed both causation-in-fact and the con-
cept that, in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, he tried to rechristen "legal
cause." Both the Second and Third Editions made a laudable attempt to clarify usage by
treating these two aspects of causation in separate chapters. By the Fourth Edition, how-
ever, Prosser had given up the fight. In that edition, the two concepts reappeared in a single
chapter, again entitled "Proximate Cause," with an apology that, because of "long ingrained
practice," "no present prospect" of stamping out the offending terminology existed. W.
PROSSER, supra note 35, at 244.
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Thus, each revision of the Handbook bore a comforting resem-
blance to its predecessors, almost like an old friend whose appear-
ance remains unchanged from visit to visit but for the addition of a
bit of the latest finery here or there.38
On examination, however, the seeming familiarity of the
Handbook's successive editions proves to have been in large mea-
sure an illusion-but an illusion with a purpose. Prosser claimed
merely to be classifying, cataloguing, and synthesizing the reported
decisions to reveal the general rules, or at least the bundles of rele-
vant factors, underlying them all. In doing so, of course, he
brought order and predictability to entire areas of law that there-
tofore had been studies in particularized chaos. The process, how-
ever, had substantive consequences, intended or otherwise.
Most of the changes wrought by Prosser were highly beneficial
in developing and settling the law. 9 His contribution to advancing
the law of privacy as a separate tort, for example, can hardly be
understated. Before Prosser, the tort lacked any unifying core of
doctrine. True, Warren and Brandeis had drawn attention to the
need for society to protect the privacy of individuals in certain lim-
ited circumstances, notably when the media disclosed "gossipy"
details of prominent people's private lives,40 and, in the wake of
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,41 the New York legislature
had provided statutory protections against unauthorized commer-
38. Indeed, White says that a perusal of the organization of the Handbook's first four
editions might leave one with "the impression. . . that tort law had changed only slightly
from the 1940s to the 1970s." G.E. WHrrs, supra note 5, at 178.
39. To be sure, a few of Prosser's well-meaning improvements on the law seem of du-
bious utility. Anyone who has taught torts from the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz casebook,
for example, occasionally must have doubted the wisdom of drilling into young minds the
famous Prosser pseudo-rules for deciding "last clear chance" cases: (1) when plaintiff is
helpless but defendant is aware of his or her peril, "all of the courts" allow recovery, al-
though (2), in helpless plaintiff or unaware defendant cases, only a "considerable majority"
hold for plaintiff, whereas (3), when plaintiff is merely inattentive and defendant is aware of
the peril, "most courts" permit a plaintiff's verdict, except that (4), if the matter is really
one involving an inattentive plaintiff but an unaware defendant, "nearly all of the courts"
agree that the plaintiff cannot recover. See W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 427-33 (same
characterizations of fact patterns as in First Edition, but more definite statements of courts'
decisionmaking tendencies concerning each of Prosser's "rules"). Arguably, the law of last
clear chance existed in a state of deplorable confusion before Prosser. The predictive value
of his formulations, however, appears to be practically nil, and even he conceded elsewhere
that there is "no substitute for dealing with the particular facts." Prosser, supra note 18, at
32; see also G.E. WHrrE, supra note 5, at 158-61 (discussing Prosser's contribution to devel-
opment of last clear chance doctrine).
40. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195-96 (1890).
41. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (refusal to recognize claim for commercial
appropriation).
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cial exploitation of a person's name or likeness. 2 Nonetheless, in
1941 privacy remained nothing more than a catchbin of cases and
concerns that the legal community dimly perceived to be somehow
related.
In the First Edition of the Handbook, Prosser lumped the
fledgling "right of privacy" with immunities, joint torts, and elec-
tion to sue for restitution in a final chapter entitled simply "Mis-
cellaneous." Arranging the cases into three distinct groups, 43 he de-
scribed the right "as primarily concerned with the protection of a
mental interest,"" and, as such, "only a phase of the larger prob-
lem of the protection of the plaintiff's peace of mind against unrea-
sonable disturbance. '45 Thus, if intentional infliction of emotional
distress were ever to receive general recognition, "the great major-
ity of the privacy cases [might] be expected to be absorbed into
it.''46 By the appearance of the Second Edition in 1955, Prosser
saw a substantially brighter future for the right of privacy than he
had predicted originally. Moving quickly past the dispute about
whether the tort existed at all, he declared privacy to be "in reality
a complex of four distinct wrongs ' 47 and awarded it a chapter
of its own immediately following defamation. By 1960 he had fully
rejected any understanding of privacy rights as merely a residual
category of tort law and declared them to be "an independent ba-
sis of liability. '48 The Third Edition in 1964 identified the "com-
mon features" of the four branches of the tort,49 and the Fourth
Edition in 1971 almost proudly proclaimed that "as yet no decided
case allowing recovery" in privacy had occurred "which does not
fall fairly within one of the four categories" that Prosser himself
had invented!50
42. 1903 N.Y. LAWS ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (current version at N.Y. Cv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1976)).
43. At this point, Prosser's terminology was imprecise-understandably so, in view of
the essentially creative character of the effort. Today's students would recognize the three
types of cases distinguished in the First Edition as commercial appropriation, public disclos-
ure of private facts, and intrusion into the plaintiff's solitude.
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 1053, citing Harper and McNeely, A Re-examination
of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426.
45. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 1053-54.
46. Id.
47. The fourth wrong, added to Prosser's catalogue since 1941, was what we presently
call "false light" privacy.
48. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 422 (1960).
49. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 842-44 (3d ed. 1964) (e.g., plaintiff
in each instance has a personal rather than a property right).
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 816.
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It was a bravura performance. In his typical fashion, Prosser
had collected the cases, rationalized their results by distilling the
underlying concerns of the courts, balanced the interests at stake
in each of the various (but previously unrecognized) branches of
the tort, and stated general rules for use in deciding future cases.51
Similar stories might be told concerning many other torts that
Prosser "sponsored" over the years.52
In assessing the Handbook's importance to the literature of
torts, the validity and worth of its author's insights on any particu-
lar topic may properly be subject to debate. This much, however, is
not: in the last thirty years of his life, Prosser lived to see his unas-
suming hornbook become indisputably the single most important
torts resource in America. Speaking of the Fourth Edition on the
occasion of Prosser's death, his friend and colleague, Laurence El-
dredge, said simply: "I doubt if any American scholar in the field
of torts could hope to equal it."5' It has fallen to the revisers of the
Fifth Edition to try to do just that. How well have they succeeded?
IV. THE FIFTH EDITION
Prosser's passing in 1972 occasioned among his professional
colleagues both a flood of fond recollection and a profound sense of
loss. 5 4 In every meaning of the word, he had become irreplaceable.
Yet, at the time of his death, much of his work was ongoing. How,
and by whom, should it be continued?
Fortunately, two of Prosser's projects already were assured of
an able successor: Dean John W. Wade of Vanderbilt. Wade fol-
lowed Prosser as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts
51. See also G.E. WHrMs, supra note 5, at 173-76 (discussing Prosser's contribution to
the development of privacy law).
52. Space limitations prevent the multiplication of examples in this Review, but read-
ers interested in further exploration quickly will discover certain predictable patterns in
Prosser's method. His campaign to expand the law of products liability, to take but one
instance, bears a striking resemblance to the right of privacy saga just recounted. White
discusses these efforts at length. See id. at 168-73. Also of interest is the treatment accorded
Prosser's contributions to products liability in Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
416, 505-18 (1985). While acknowledging Prosser's "extraordinary influence over the direc-
tion of the law," Priest argues that Prosser's "ideas and proposals were derived from those
of [Fleming] James and [Friedrich] Kessler" and that he accomplished the adoption of §
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by the American Law Institute through "clever
exhortation built on a blurred interpretation of then-current legal developments." Id. at
465.
53. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 1246-47.
54. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 1; Eldredge, supra note 5; Malone, More in Sorrow
Than in Anger, 60 CALiF. L. Rav. 1252 (1972).
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upon the latter's resignation in 1970.1 In addition, at Prosser's in-
vitation, Wade had become coauthor of Prosser's casebook begin-
ning with the 1971 edition s.5
The Handbook was another matter, although perhaps less
pressing. The Fourth Edition had been published in 1971, only a
year before Prosser's death. It had neither a coauthor nor a desig-
nated successor. 7 That choice, therefore, fell to West Publishing
Company, which held the copyright in the work. In 1976, West ap-
proached W. Page Keeton of Texas about the possibility of updat-
ing the Handbook, and Keeton agreed.5 s The scale and importance
of the undertaking led Keeton, in turn, to engage the assistance of
three additional revisers59 under Keeton's own leadership as Gen-
eral Editor. The product of their labors, entitled Prosser and Kee-
ton on the Law of Torts, appeared in 1984.60
55. Volumes 1 and 2 of the Second Restatement were carried to completion by Prosser
and published in 1965. At the time of his resignation, Prosser also had prepared, and had
reviewed with his Advisers (including Wade), preliminary drafts for the remaining two
volumes. Portions of the outstanding Prosser drafts, especially those concerning defamation
and privacy, were quickly outdated by major upheavals in the law. These portions were
subsequently rewritten by the new Reporter. Overall, the drafts required extensive revision
and supplementation. Volumes 3 and 4, bearing the distinct imprint of Wade's careful re-
consideration of the areas of law treated therein, were published by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1977 and 1979 respectively. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, vol. 3 at VII-VIII
(1977), vol. 4 at VII-VIII (1979).
56. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 1971). Wests
friendly rival, Foundation Press, Inc., publishes the casebook, supra note 4, now in its Sev-
enth Edition. Wade's present coauthor is Victor E. Schwartz, a prominent Washington D.C.,
practitioner.
57. Prosser apparently had anticipated that Prof. Allan H. McCoid of the University
of Minnesota Law School would assume responsibility for the Handbook, but McCoid's
tragic death in 1973 forestalled that plan.
58. Keeton had long been a professional associate of Prosser. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text (Keeton's book review of the Handbook's First Edition). In addition,
Keeton and his brother Robert previously had coauthored a torts casebook in West's Ameri-
can Casebook Series: P. KEETON & R. KERoN, CASES AND MATERALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(1st ed. 1971, 2d ed. 1977). The present version of that work is P. KEETON. R. KEETON. L.
SARGENTICH & H. STEINER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, AND AccnDENT LAW (1983).
59. See supra note 7 (listing names and institutional affiliations of other revisers).
60. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6. Although Prosser's name has been deleted
from the list of authors, it now appears (with Page Keeton's) in the title of the work. Also,
the designation "Handbook" has been deleted from the title. Hence, the work is cited here-
inafter as "Fifth Edition."
Two further preliminary notations are appropriate here: (1) the revisers elected not to
claim individual credit for the sections of the Fifth Edition for which each had primary
responsibility, thereby creating a most entertaining guessing game for their colleagues in
academia; and (2) the cut-off date for the bulk of the research in the Fifth Edition, insofar
as one can judge from the footnote citations, appears to have been 1982.
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A. Structure and Presentation
Even the most cursory comparison of the tables of contents in
the Fourth and Fifth Editions reveals that the revisers have scru-
pulously observed one of Prosser's own cardinal precepts: no mat-
ter how extensive the substantive changes in the work as a whole, a
comforting sense of familiarity should be preserved through reten-
tion of its overall structure.6' Indeed, with but one exception,62 the
chapter-by-chapter layout of the two editions is precisely the
same.63 Within a few of the chapters, the subject matter presenta-
tion has been significantly restructured, 4 and within individual
sections, the revisers have proceeded strictly according to the dic-
tates of the material itself. Overall, however, the effect is one of
continuity with the Fourth Edition. This preservation of familiar
structure from the Handbook's previous editions undoubtedly will
promote and facilitate ready reference to the Fifth Edition by stu-
dents, lawyers, and judges.
The revisers and their publisher have taken care to maximize
the utility of the work in other, more practical ways as well. Unlike
its predecessors, the Fifth Edition is available in two versions, one
for students and one for practitioners. In virtually all significant
aspects, including the text and footnotes, the Student Edition and
the Lawyer's Edition are identical. The main differences, and cer-
tain useful common features, occur in the end matter.
One common feature is entirely predictable-the "Table of
Cases." Although otherwise valuable, the table has one notable de-
ficiency: it provides entries indexed by first-named party only (e.g.,
61. The revisers note, with only slight overstatement, that "the general plan of this
book is the same as that adopted by the Restatement of Torts." PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 6, at 31.
62. The revisers have deleted the Fourth Edition's Chapter 21 ("Constitutional Privi-
lege"), but shifted its contents to other chapters. See infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
63. The revisers have renamed a few chapters along the way in order to reflect more
accurately their contents. Generally, this is helpful. The chapter formerly entitled "Liability
Insurance," for example, has been expanded and rechristened "Compensation Systems." In
one instance, however, the result is so cumbersome that the revisers seem to have paid too
high a price for the presumed gain in clarity: Chapter 13, formerly designated "Strict Liabil-
ity," is now "Strict Liability for Physical Harm to Persons and Tangible Things From Acci-
dental Invasions."
64. Two examples of wholesale reorganization occur in the chapters concerning prod-
ucts liability and nuisance. See infra text accompanying notes 91-98, 114-20.
65. To be sure, obvious cosmetic differences exist between the two versions. The bind-
ing of the Lawyer's Edition, for example, is satisfyingly more posh; and the Student Edition
omits any consideration of the West Hornbook Series' venerable antecedents. See supra
note 6. But clearly such features, by themselves, would not justify the $19 price differential
between the two editions.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan appears under "N" but not "S").
That failing, however, is unavoidable because the table already fills
171 pages.
The second feature common to both editions-an appendix
entitled "WESTLAW References"-is more unusual. The purpose
of the appendix is to explain the use of WESTLAW, the pub-
lisher's computer-assisted legal research service, in conjunction
with the preformulated search requests that follow every section of
the text. WESTLAW staff members, rather than the revisers, pre-
pared the search requests (or "queries"). On the whole, the queries
appear to perform as promised,s6 and the appendix provides sug-
gestions to assist the user in tailoring a preformulated search re-
quest to suit his or her specific research problem.6 7 This feature is
mercifully short at only fourteen pages.
In addition to the two resources just mentioned, the end mat-
ter to the Lawyer's Edition contains two features not available in
the Student Edition. The first is an eighty-three page table tracing
the recent history of "Prosser in the Courts." The table lists cases
decided since January 1, 1978, that cite the Fourth Edition of the
Handbook as authority.65 Citations are arranged under the section
number of the subject matter as it appears in the Fifth Edition. A
prefatory note by the publisher explains that "the primary purpose
of the table is to afford ready access to the prevailing local rule or,
where local precedent is inadequate, to other judicial authority. ' 69
66. There are exceptions. For example, one of the queries following § 96 of the text
("Negligence and Liability for Physical Harm to Persons and Tangible Things") reads:
"topic(313a) /p negligen** /p fail! adequate** /p warn!". When the author first tested this
query in early 1985 using the "ALLSTATES" database, WESTLAW rejected the specified
request with the notation: "YOUR QUERY CANNOT BE COMPLETED BECAUSE IT
HAS GENERATED TOO MANY SEARCH TERMS TO BE PROCESSED EFFI-
CIENTLY." The search logic of WESTLAW was modified subsequently, and the query in
question now runs without objection.
67. Despite these virtues, the crassly commercial and self-laudatory tone of this ap-
pendix likely will offend at least a few readers. One doubts, for example, whether it was
necessary to advise the reader, as the final sentence of the appendix does, that "[tihe power
and flexibility of WESTLAW affords users of [the Fifth Edition] a unique opportunity to
greatly enhance their access to and understanding of the law of torts." PROSSER AND KEE-
TON, supra note 6, Lawyer's Ed. at 1174, Student Ed. at 1090.
68. The publisher compiled the table using a full text word search on WESTLAW.
West chose the beginning date for the search arbitrarily, presumably with an eye both to
printing costs and to the table's utility. PROSSER AND KEaTON, supra note 6, at 1177.
A similarly derived table appears in the latest edition of C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON
EviDENCE (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984), probably West's second most popular hornbook. "McCor-
mick in the Courts" contains approximately 3000 entries. Perhaps to no one's surprise,
"Prosser in the Courts" is larger still at 3443 entries.
69. PRossER AND KEE'oN, supra note 6, at 1177. The revisers, exercising commendable
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The second significant feature of the Lawyer's Edition not
found in the Student Edition is an eighty-two page appendix enti-
tled "Significant Statutes and Proposed Statutes on Tort Law."
This compendium provides examples of federal and state legisla-
tion, either already enacted or presently under consideration, in ar-
eas of the law in which codification of tort principles is, or is be-
coming, prevalent.7 0 Among the statutes discussed are sample
medical malpractice acts, the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
the Federal Tort Claims Act, various civil rights statutes, federal
and state trademark acts, and proposed (but as yet unadopted)
legislation concerning products liability and comparative fault.71
Like the appendices, the text of the Fifth Edition provides
ample evidence of the revisers' learning and industry. Quite apart
from instances of significant substantive reworking, 2 the revisers'
determination to enhance the value of the work to the reader is
plainly visible. Virtually all the chapters sport new introductions
clearly establishing the practical and doctrinal contexts of the ma-
terial to follow. Within each chapter, the presentation generally is
organized more clearly than in predecessor editions, often with ad-
ditional and more precise headings to highlight important distinc-
tions. In their choice of langauge, the revisers have been sensitive
to the problem of gender-specificity.7 8 Even the Fifth Edition's
restraint, appear not to have made any special effort in their footnotes to include cases
citing the Fourth Edition as authority.
70. Prosser's likely reaction to this appendix must remain a matter of amusing conjec-
ture. His attachment to the common law was legendary, and the Fourth Edition straightfor-
wardly identified courts as the principal crucibles of "social engineering" in the field of
torts. See W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 14-16. Although tort law no doubt remains over-
whelmingly a creature of common law, Americans in the 1980s live in an era of accelerating
codification. The revisers recognize the point explicitly in the Fifth Edition's helpful § 3
("Policy and Process"), acknowledging the difficulties that this development poses for the
courts and referring the reader to thoughtful reflections on the problem in the secondary
literature, including CALnRsI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1981). See PROS-
SER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 15-20.
71. Senate Bill 44, the proposed products liability statute, was introduced in Congress
in January 1983, but died in committee. The sample comparative negligence statute, curi-
ously, is not the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Rather, it is a proposed state act, rejected
in Texas despite sponsorship by a blue ribbon committee of the State Bar (including Page
Keeton), which the revisers nonetheless suggest could be adopted "in any state... by judi-
cial decision." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 1148.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 104-23.
73. In § 32, for example, the Reasonable Man has become the Reasonable Person. The
revisers' general sensitivity to the problem of sexist language, however, should not be con-
fused with a whole-hearted commitment to the use of inclusive language in its place. As they
explain in a prefatory note, "[t]he pronouns 'he,' 'his,' 'him,"' used throughout the book,
"are not intended to convey the masculine gender alone"; rather, they are employed "in a
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footnotes are greatly improved. 74 Old cases and articles have been
culled for relevance, and new matter added for currency. In addi-
tion, the revisers have addressed and remedied one of the Hand-
book's most glaring deficiencies: the footnotes to the Fifth Edition
quite consistently say what the text indicates they are supposed to
say.75
One further notable aspect of the text generally: in comparison
with prior volumes of the Handbook, the Fifth Edition places con-
siderably less emphasis on common-law history and correspond-
ingly greater stress on contemporary developments, including fre-
quent references to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.78  The
revisers also refer often to recent academic literature, including,
appropriately, their own work.77 Interestingly, however, the Fifth
Edition contains few, if any, citations to the growing and impor-
tant body of scholarship devoted to economic analysis of tort law.78
generic sense so as to avoid awkward grammatical situations which would likely occur due to
the limitations of the English language." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, Lawyer's Ed.
at vii, Student Ed. at xvii.
74. One purely mechanical but exceedingly welcome improvement is that footnote
numbers begin afresh with each section rather than simply repeating from 1 to 99, as in
prior editions.
75. In fairness, the Fifth Edition has the great advantage that many of Prosser's cam-
paigns for reform, supported in previous editions of the Handbook by citations of dubious
relevance, succeeded so well that the revisers now can justify the propositions advanced in
their text by reference to cases that invoke the Handbook as authority!
For another reflection on Prosser's propensity for invoking cases not directly on point in
support of one or another of his campaigns for improvement of the law, consider Priest's
assessment of the decisions cited by Prosser to the American Law Institute in urging the
adoption of the final, broadly stated version of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A: "A
rereading of these cases today suggests either that what Prosser meant by strict liability is
vastly different from the regime that has evolved or that Prosser's discovery of a trend in
the case law was largely his own creation." Priest, supra note 52, at 514.
76. One explanation for the revisers' greater reliance on the Restatement (Second) is
that two of its volumes appeared subsequent to publication of the Fourth Edition. See
supra note 55. But the revisers also seem to delight less in the peculiarities of common law
historical development than did Prosser, and to be more devoted to the systematic explica-
tion of the law that reference to the Restatement facilitates.
To be sure, in some instances, contrary to the general pattern, the revisers deemphasize
the Restatement (Second). See, e.g., infra note 92 (cites but does not quote provisions of §
402A). In such instances, case law development and critical scholarship subsequent to the
Fourth Edition arguably justify decreased attention to Restatement formulations.
77. If anything, the revisers are less aggressive in promoting their views than one rea-
sonably might have expected. For example, in Chapter 14 ("Compensation Systems"), the
revisers have deleted Prosser's sarcasm but otherwise preserved most of the Fourth Edi-
tion's text-including Prosser's discussion of the Keeton-O'Connell plan (proposing "no-
fault" automobile insurance), which is actually shortened.
78. See, e.g., IR PosNMH , ECONoMc ANALYsiS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); G. CALABRESi, THE
COSTS OF AccIDErs: A LEGAL AND ECONobc ANALYSis (1970); Symposium on Efficiency as
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The rationale, although unstated, is clear: such analysis is radically
incompatible with Consensus Thought, as represented by both
Prosser and the revisers.79 Indeed, Page Keeton describes the se-
lection of his fellow revisers as having been based on the princilile
that "those participating in the revision process should in general
be sympathetic with (a) the nature and structure of the book to be
revised, and (b) the major objectives of the book's original
author." 0
Looking, then, solely at structure and presentation, one can
safely observe that the Fifth Edition significantly adds to, and in
many ways improves upon, its predecessors. But what of the sub-
stance of the Fifth Edition?
B. Substantive Aspects
Several chapters in the new Prosser and Keeton have been
heavily revised from the Fourth Edition, largely because of the
vast amount of change in the law since 1971. Perhaps the most
obvious reworking is the deletion of the Fourth Edition's chapter
on constitutional privilege,8 ' accompanied by the integration of its
subject matter into the Fifth Edition's chapters on defamation 2
and privacy. 3 The lack of similar integration had been a conspicu-
ous deficiency of the Fourth Edition. There, for example, Prosser's
chapter on defamation 84 consisted of sixty-five pages, but failed
completely to apprise the reader of the significant constitutional-
ization of the area that the Supreme Court already was undertak-
a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485; A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 811 (1980).
79. Economic analysis of law focuses its examination of torts cases on the costs-both
social and private-of injury-causing occurrences, with a view toward allocating resources to
maximize efficiency. The basis of such analysis "is the assumption that the people involved
with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions"; its conclusion, "that
the logic of the law is really economics ... " Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53
TEx L. REV. 757, 761, 764 (1975).
The revisers are not alone among contemporary torts scholars, of course, in giving short
shift to this school of thought in their commentaries. See generally, e.g., M. SHAPO, To-
WARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 2-17 (1984) (opting instead for a more traditional process of
decisionmaking, in part because of "its telescopic perspective, comprehending a multitude of
interests and considerations outside the articulated, or judicially divined, risk-benefit
choices of the parties").
80. PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 6, Lawyer's Ed. at ix, Student Ed. at xix.
81. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 819-33.
82. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 771-848.
83. Id. at 849-69.
84. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 737-801.
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ing. Not until the chapter on constitutional privilege" was New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"" decided seven years before the publi-
cation of the Fourth Edition, even cited-and then only once.8 7 No
doubt, Prosser recognized the importance of Sullivan and its prog-
eny.8 But his isolation of these cases in a separate chapter and the
discussion in the defamation chapter tended to emphasize com-
mon-law history at the expense of current first amendment devel-
opments of superseding consequence. In the Fifth Edition the re-
visers correct that imbalance by placing proportionately more
emphasis on the constitutional aspects of modern defamation law
and by interweaving their discussion of Sullivan and more recent
first amendment cases89 with an explanation of the common-law
principles of continuing significance in the area. The revisers treat
privacy law similarly.90
Another example of extensive revision mandated chiefly by ex-
tensive case law development is the Fifth Edition's chapter on
products liability.91 In this area, perhaps more than any other, the
torrent of decisions since 1971 had rendered the Fourth Edition's
discussion obsolete long before the appearance of its successor.
That obsolescence, however, resulted only in part from the sheer
number of cases. The greater significance of the courts' hyperactiv-
ity in the products liability field in the 1970s and early 1980s was
that it exposed the numerous and difficult theoretical problems
barely visible on the horizon when the Fourth Edition went to
press. Relatively speaking, Prosser's task was easy. With respect to
strict tort liability for products, for example, he could content him-
self with offering little more than the Restatement (Second)'s Sec-
tion 402A91 and Justice Traynor's seminal opinion in Greenman v.
85. See supra note 81.
86. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 819-21.
88. E.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
Besides describing Sullivan as a "bombshell," W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 819, Pros-
ser asserted flatly that the Court's broadening of the traditional defamation privileges there
and in subsequent decisions was "unquestionably the greatest victory won by the defend-
ants in the modern history of the law of torts." Id.
89. E.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
90. Compare W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 802-18 with PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 6, at 849-69.
91. PROSSER AND K=nTON, supra note 6, at 677-724.
92. Prosser quoted § 402A in the text of the Fourth Edition. W. PROSSER, supra note
35, at 657. The revisers of the Fifth Edition merely allude to §402A, PRossER AND KTON,
supra note 6, at 693, without setting forth its oft-cited terms in their text or footnotes.
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Yuba Power Products, Inc. (which Prosser described as "[t]he first
case to apply [section 402A]"),1s and the satisfied observation that,
by 1971, this "simple ground" of products liability had "swept the
country.""4 Strict products liability, however, has proved to be ariy-
thing but "simple." An obvious instance concerns the types of
damages for which recovery should be permitted under each of the
available theories. Whereas the Fourth Edition barely noticed the
issue, 5 the Fifth Edition delineates the problem and propounds
solutions.9 " Similarly, the newer edition is greatly more detailed
and clear than its predecessor in discussing the many problems,
including availability of the state-of-the-art defense, that have con-
fronted the courts in their attempts to define when a product is
dangerously defective or unsafe.9 7 In summary, the products liabil-
ity chapter, like the chapters on defamation and privacy, illus-
trates the revisers' considerable facility in updating, adapting, clar-
ifying, and, in general, improving the materials that Prosser
bequeathed them."8
Interestingly, despite the revisers' general enthusiasm for up-
Presumably, the revisers were influenced in this decision by the substantial criticism to
which § 402A has been subjected, both in the courts and in learned publications. See, e.g.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). Still, it seems
peculiar virtually to omit discussion of the provision around which so much of the later
debate has centered.
93. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), characterized in W. PROSSER,
supra note 35, at 657. The revisers, with the benefit of hindsight, note more accurately that
Greenman was "[t]he first case to apply a tort theory of strict liability generally." PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 694.
94. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 657.
95. Id. § 101 ("Interests Protected").
96. For example, the revisers come down firmly in favor of permitting recovery, under
strict liability in tort, for physical harm to persons and tangible property, but would pre-
clude awards for intangible direct or consequential economic losses except under warranty
theory. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, §§ 95A ("Warranty and Intangible Eco-
nomic Losses"), 98 ("Strict Liability in Tort for Physical Harm to Persons and Tangible
Things"), 101 ("Summary-Interests Protected and Theories of Recovery").
97. See id. § 99 ("Meaning of Dangerously Defective or Unsafe Products"). The foot-
notes to this section, and indeed to the entire chapter, are especially full and helpful. The
revisers have been careful to cite examples of scholarship representing a variety of view-
points, including their own. On the particularly vexing issue of whether strict liability
should be imposed on manufacturers for failure to warn of dangers not knowable as of the
date of marketing, a citation candidly ackowledges a change in position by one of the revis-
ers. Id. at 697 n.21; see also Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Un-
available Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 761-64 (1983).
98. Other chapters, although not revised wholesale for updating changes, contain indi-
vidual sections dramatically revised for that purpose. E.g., PROSSER AND KERTON, supra note
6, ch. 9 ("Limited Duty"), § 55 ("Prenatal Injuries").
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dating, they have not become wild-eyed, plaintiff-oriented radicals,
determined to be "on the cutting edge" at all costs. For instance,
in discussing the trend inspired by Rowland v. Christian9 toward
abolition of the traditional distinctions in the duties of care owed
to persons entering land (based upon the entrant's status as a tres-
passer, licensee, or invitee), the Fifth Edition notes that the aboli-
tion movement has come "to a screeching halt," as courts "ac-
quir[e] more generally a healthy skepticism toward invitations to
jettison years of developed jurisprudence in favor of a beguiling
legal panacea."100 Similarly, at the conclusion of a valuable exami-
nation of the effects of the adoption of comparative fault upon
other tort doctrines,10 1 the revisers caution courts "not to become
caught up by the sheer momentum of the movement, and with the
facile simplicity of the doctrine, but instead [to] apply deliberate
thought to each new call for its further extension."102 In these
passages, the Fifth Edition seems to be much less a vehicle of re-
form than were its predecessors.103
The revisers, however, are not entirely without an agenda of
their own. On the contrary, many of the Fifth Edition's most inter-
esting changes from prior incarnations of the Handbook result not
primarily from updating, but from the revisers' disagreement with
Prosser over the treatment of certain topics. Generally speaking,
these changes are the product of the revisers' effort to achieve a
clearer understanding of the present state of the law, rather than
proposals for new departures in doctrine.
Typical of this latter type of change is the Fifth Edition's
treatment of causation in fact.1° ' In the main, the revisers have
performed what might be called a "nip and tuck" operation. They
carefully preserve the Prosser legacy-the framework of analysis,
the actual language of the Fourth Edition whenever possible, and
even most of the hypotheticals and examples that Prosser drew
from the case law-while tightening a little here, clarifying a little
there. 105 But the revisers also make their own contribution, and
99. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
100. PROSSER AND KEEON, supra note 6, at 433-34.
101. These doctrines include last clear chance, assumption of risk, and liability theo-
ries not based on negligence.
102. PROSSER AND KaTON, supra note 6, at 479 (footnote omitted).
103. Cf., e.g., supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (expansion of right of privacy
in earlier editions).
104. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, ch. 7 ("Proximate Cause"), § 41 ("Causation
in Fact") at 263-72.
105. The usual element of updating is also present. In discussing the plaintiff's burden
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identify it unambiguously as their own. In describing the "substan-
tial factor" test exemplified by the Minnesota Supreme Court's de-
cision in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry. Co.,106 Pros-
ser had commented that, as applied to actual causation, "no better
test" had yet been devised.1 0 7 The revisers not only delete that ob-
servation, but offer a new, "more helpful" test, apparently of their
own devising:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and
application of the but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of them,
the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event."0 8
The revisers make a strong case for their alternative formula-
tion,109 which in many respects provides an apt latter-day example
of Consensus Thought at work. The Fifth Edition, however, then
proceeds to do something that would have been highly unusual in
prior editions of the Handbook: it lets light in on the magic.
Rather than citing selected cases consistent with their new test
and leaving it at that, as Prosser typically did when no authority
directly supported his own additions to the law, the revisers simply
aver the existence of these cases and straightforwardly admit that
"no judicial opinion has approved this formulation."110 No doubt
the revisers should be commended, as scholars, for their candor,
but forthright disclosure that their alternative test lacks direct
support in the case law takes much of the fun out of the game and,
more importantly, may decrease the likelihood that this sensible
attempt to restate the unifying rationale underlying the reported
decisions will be explicitly adopted by others.1
of proof in causation-in-fact cases, the Fifth Edition considers not only Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), which had received extensive treatment in the Fourth Edition,
but also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980), the more recent decisions first applying the theory of market share liability. PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 271-72.
106. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
107. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 240.
108. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 268.
109. Id. at 268-69.
110. Id. at 268 n.40 (emphasis added).
111. Elsewhere in Chapter 7, in the discussion of legal (or "proximate") cause, the
revisers are more subtle in advocating their own viewpoints. Compare, for example, § 42's
discussion of "Generalizations About Proximate Cause" and § 45's survey of "Functions of
Court and Jury," id. at 273-74, 319-21, with R. KEroN, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
49-60, 79-81, 90-100 (1963). Having forcefully made the case for a "fresh approach" to the
Risk Rule in determinations of tort liability, Keeton notes that, at least regarding adoption
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, further advocacy would have proved "futile," owing
to "the obstacle of firmly held contrary opinions, including that of the Reporter" (citing the
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The chapters on nuisance" 2 and strict liability113 provide even
more dramatic instances of revisions based principally on differ-
ences of opinion between Prosser and the revisers. The former
chapter, besides being greatly elaborated," 4 has been reorganized
entirely and presents perhaps the most conspicuous example of
strong disagreement.' 1  Among other deviations from the Prosser-
ian gospel, the revisers reject the Fourth Edition's contention that
"nuisance is a field of tort liability, rather than a type of tortious
conduct."' 6 Rather, in the view of the revisers, "[p]rivate nuisance
is a tort . ..arising from the [actor's] intentional interference
[with] an interest in land that is deemed worthy of legal protec-
tion."1 7 The revisers also disagree with Prosser's description of the
proximate cause chapter of the Second Edition of the Handbook). Id. at 96 & n.95.
112. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, ch. 15 at 616-54 ("Nuisance").
113. Id., ch. 13 at 534-83 ("Strict Liability for Physical Harm to Persons and Tangible
Things From Accidental Invasions").
114. Chapter 15 is nearly half again as long in the Fifth Edition as it was in the
Fourth. The writing, although it may lack Prosser's verve, is considerably more clear. One
quibble: the revisers have "adopted," to use their own words, a highly useful passage from
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF R mDis 332-35 (1973), concerning the availability of
damages as a remedy in actions for nuisance. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 637-40.
Using a direct quotation of such length, with concomitant problems in the numbering of its
extensive footnotes, seems unduly awkward. Perhaps it will be possible in future editions
simply to recast this material, with an appropriate acknowledgment, as part of the text of
PROSSER AND KEETON.
115. Compare the section headings employed by Prosser and the revisers:
FOURTH EDITION FIFTH EDITION
§ 86. Meaning of Nuisance § 86. Meaning of Nuisance -
Historical Origins
§ 87. Basis of Liability § 87. Private Nuisance: The Tort
Action for Damages
§ 88. Public Nuisance § 88. Substantial and Unreasonable
Interference
§ 89. Private Nuisance § 88A. Unreasonable Conduct and
Injunctive Relief§ 90. Remedies § 88B. Conduct of Others and the
Plaintiff as Factors of Importance
§ 91. Defenses § 88C. "Absolute" Nuisance
§ 89. Remedies§ 90. Public Nuisance: Remedies
Available to the State
Elsewhere throughout the Fifth Edition, the revisers have been at pains to preserve at least
the structure of presentation that Prosser employed in earlier editons. See supra notes 61-
64 and accompanying text.
116. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 573.
117. PROSSER AND KE TON, supra note 6, at 622 (emphasis added). The revisers' objec-
tions are not confined to Prosser's treatment of private nuisance in prior editions. At an-
other point in the Fifth Edition, they describe § 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as approving liability for interference with another's use and enjoyment of land "not only
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theoretical basis of the private tort action arising from a public
nuisance. In the Fourth Edition Prosser had stated that a private
action will lie "[only] if the plaintiff [can] show that he ha[s] suf-
fered damage particular to him, and not shared in common by the
rest of the public." ' s The revisers suggest instead that
a better description of the results of cases would show that a private individ-
ual cannot complain of public nuisance either by way of maintaining a tort
action for damages or by way of obtaining a abatement of the so-called nui-
sance unless the conduct has resulted in the commission of an independent
tort to the plaintiff.19
What seems odd is not the revisers' reconsideration of the tort's
basis-which, although not beyond argument, certainly has much
to recommend it-but rather their method of expounding it. Had
Prosser himself thought it useful to readers to adopt a revised pat-
tern of analysis, he simply would have replaced the old with the
new. The revisers offer both,20 thereby depriving their own recom-
mended approach of the authority that they presumably believe it
deserves. Similarly, in the strict- liability chapter, the revisers
clearly endorse the policy choices embedded in section 520 of the
original Restatement of Torts,1 21 believe that the Restatement
(Second) represents a historic "wrong turn" in the law,1 22 and
therefore reject the positions that Prosser espoused in prior edi-
when the interference is intentional and proves to be unreasonable, but also when the inter-
ference is accidental and otherwise actionable under rules controlling liability either for neg-
ligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous conduct"; and they observe dryly that this provi-
sion "has produced much confusion and some erroneous results." Id. at 652. The same
determination to distinguish carefully between intentional and accidental invasions of inter-
ests led the revisers to make substantial revisions in Chapter 3 ("Intentional Interference
With Property") also.
118. W. PROSSa, supra note 35, at 586.
119. PROSSER AND KEBTON, supra note 6, at 650-51 (emphasis added).
120. The subsection entitled "The Tort Action-[A] General Case Approach," id. at
646-50, is lifted in toto from the Fourth Edition. The subsection entitled "The Tort Ac-
tion-A Recommended Approach," id. at 650-52, is entirely new. Apparently out of defer-
ence to Prosser's memory, the Fifth Edition does not indicate the authorship of either
subsection.
121. As capsulized by the revisers, "the idea was to visit strict liability on all those
actors, almost altogether enterprisers, who elected to engage in an activity, however socially
desirable, that introduced into the community... [a] risk... both highly dangerous and
unusual." The revisers hold that "the First Restatement set forth the best way of articulat-
ing and describing the requirements that ought to be met for applying strict liability to
dangerous activities." Id. at 555.
122. According to the revisers, the Restatement (Second) "is an attempt to combine
Prosser's original ideas as to 'non-natural' or 'extraordinary uses' with the ideas accepted in
the First Restatement," but "without any substantial change in judicial decisions" that
would have justified the reformulation. The result-the six-factor analysis contained in pre-
sent § 520-is "virtually the same thing" as negligence theory and thus "unsatisfactory." Id.
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tions of the Handbook. But they retain Prosser's treatment of ab-
normally dangerous things and activities from the Fourth Edition
and merely append a short statement of their own views.121
The revisers' decision not to excise Prosser's views on these
and other points of disagreement is deliberate. As noted in the
preface to the Fifth Edition:
However distinguished the work of the original author, a reviser must
perforce, in order to be intellectually honest, make some changes simply be-
cause of a difference of opinion about how best to explain the state of the
law, both now and as it existed at the time the previous edition was pub-
lished. Where this has been done, every effort has been made to preserve
Prosser's insights so that the user can exercise his or her own informed
judgment.12 4
The only point of debate, therefore, is whether the preservation of
views rejected by the revisers was necessary or wise. One alterna-
tive to ignoring positions taken in earlier editions of the Handbook
might have been to notice them in footnotes, with references to the
relevant pages of the Fourth Edition for the curious. A matter of
taste? Perhaps no more. But surely revisers need not be taxider-
mists. There seems little point to retaining Prosser's analyses when
they clearly are outmoded or, in the opinion of the revisers, just
plain wrong. Prosser himself believed in burying the dead, dis-
creetly but finally, and showcasing the living. 125
Fortunately, the revisers' bouts of ancestor worship are a mi-
nor problem, and, occasional quibbles about their execution aside,
the revisers' intent is entirely commendable. In undertaking what
was plainly a monumental task, they appear to have adopted as
their rule of thumb the sound maxim: "if it ain't broke, don't fix
it." Although much about the Fifth Edition differs from the
123. Compare "American Cases-Prosser's Interpretation in the 1971 Edition," id. at
548-54, with "Recent Developments and Reviser's Comments," id. at 554-56. The revisers
indicate that they have acquiesced in retaining Prosser's preferred label for the things and
activities in question ("abnormally dangerous") rather than pushing for restoration of its
First Restatement counterpart ("ultra-hazardous"), noting that "[tlhe choice between the
labels... is not too important." Id. at 555-56.
124. Id. Lawyers Ed. at ix, Student Ed. at xix (emphasis added).
125. In that spirit, the revisers might consider reviving in the Sixth Edition a device
employed with salutory results by Prosser himself in the First Edition: the chapter entitled
"Miscellaneous." In effect, Prosser treated that chapter as a kindergarten for fledgling torts,
which then graduated to chapters of their own once they achieved maturity, or at least a
promising adolescence. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (development of privacy
law). The addition of a chapter on miscellaneous or unclassified torts might enable the re-
visers to afford distinct, if not necessarily extensive, treatment to such emerging causes of
action as duress, wrongful discharge from employment, bad faith in the performance of an
insurance contract, and interference with constitutional or statutory rights.
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Fourth, the revisers obviously believed that the 1971 edition, on
the whole, was "not broke." The result is a valuable new resource,
faithful to the Prosser tradition but distinctly improved in many
critical respects by the revisers' diligence and insights.
V. CONCLUSION
To underestimate the Fifth Edition would be easy. The revis-
ers deliberately have maintained much that is familiar from prior
editions of the Handbook, and with the few exceptions noted
above,2 6 they have taken care to introduce their own contributions
as unobtrusively as possible. The true measure of the present work,
however, is a careful comparison with the Fourth Edition. Without
doubt, the Fifth Edition is easier to read, understand, and apply. It
is more current than its predecessor, of course, but it is also more
complete and, truth to tell, more clear. Even the Fifth Edition's
research aids-the various tables and appendices-have been ex-
panded and made more useful.12 7 In short, the revisers have both
preserved and significantly enhanced a resource that was already a
classic when it came into their hands.
Will the Fifth Edition, then, attain the same preeminence in
the literature of torts as did Prosser's own editions of the Hand-
book? The jury is still out, and will be for some time. But the re-
visers seem likely to suffer, just as Prosser so clearly benefited,
from the changing fashions of legal scholarship. The success of ear-
lier editions is attributable, in no small measure, to the fact that
Prosser, and the Handbook with him, rode the rising tide of Con-
sensus Thought during the middle decades of the century. In the
1970s and 1980s that tide has ebbed. Economic analysis of law, the
major competing school of thought today, 2 ' seeks consistency of
result by means which Prosser never would have counte-
nanced. Nor have the revisers made any attempt to represent that
school in the Fifth Edition.' The popularity of the work may suf-
fer accordingly among those no longer in sympathy with the dis-
tinctive philosophical foundation upon which the Handbook al-
ways has rested. It seems doubtful whether any current revision,
126. See supra text accompanying notes 104-24.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
128. See supra note 79.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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even one by Prosser himself, could have avoided these vicissitudes.
In any event, his successors have done no more, or less, than to be
faithful custodians of his legacy.

